Constitutional Ceiling for Parliamentary Thresholds after Constitutional Court Decision No. 116/PUU-XXI/2023: Redefining Legislative Discretion

Abstract

This study examines the transformation of the open legal policy doctrine following Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia No. 116/PUU-XXI/2023 and develops the concept of constitutional ceiling as a constitutional limitation on legislative discretion in determining the parliamentary threshold. This normative legal research employs statutory, case, conceptual, and comparative approaches. The analysis is based on constitutional provisions, electoral legislation, the Constitutional Court’s decision, and validated national and international literature using qualitative content and thematic analysis. The findings demonstrate a paradigm shift from merely recognizing open legal policy toward evaluating legislative justification, including constitutional legitimacy, rationality, and academic justification underlying legislative choices. The study formulates the Constitutional Ceiling Theory, which establishes six constitutional parameters: constitutional legitimacy, proportionality, equality of political rights, electoral fairness, legal certainty, and democratic necessity. Rather than replacing open legal policy, the constitutional ceiling constrains legislative discretion within the principles of constitutional democracy, the rule of law, and constitutional rights protection. The proposed framework contributes to contemporary constitutional law by advancing a new model of constitutional review and providing normative guidance for constitutionally compliant and evidence-based electoral legislation.